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Abstract 
Over the past twenty years, following the end of the Cold War, the defense 
industrial base in the US has witnessed many changes and continues to face new 
challenges. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the evolution of the US and 
global defense industrial base in response to the shifting economic and strategic 
landscape. Specifically, it examines the impact of macroeconomic factors on the 
defense industrial bases in the US and overseas, and discusses the trends in fiscal 
debts and deficits and their potential impact on military spending. Second, it 
discusses the impact of the shift in defense priorities toward irregular warfare and 
away from conventional warfare on the defense industrial base, and discusses areas 
of growth, as well as potential shrinkage. Third, it evaluates the ability of large 
defense contractors to compete with smaller firms in growing market spaces due to 
rising legacy overhead costs, as well as the financial impact of the strategic business 
base shift of large defense contractors. The analysis then assesses the development 
of the global defense industrial base and the role of foreign contractors in the US 
defense industrial base. In examining global supply chain arrangements, which 
promote interlinkages between domestic industrial bases, the study looks at the role 
of exchange rate volatility and declining military spending on defense products. 
Finally, the analysis examines the greater overseas orientation of elements of the 
US defense industrial base which are focused on traditional military equipment, as 
well as the growth of overseas defense industrial bases.      
Keywords: US and global defense industrial base, shifting economic and 
strategic landscape, defense contractors, foreign contractors, global supply chain 
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I. Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, following the end of the Cold War, the defense 
industrial base in the US has witnessed many changes. First, reductions in defense 
budgets during the 1990’s contributed to consolidation among US defense 
contractors and a contraction in the US defense industrial base. Many defense 
industry sub-sectors manifested a 2/3 reduction in the number of prime contractors 
and came to be dominated by larger defense giants formed from the consolidations: 
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics. 
Second, the post 9/11 period has witnessed an increased emphasis on insurgent 
forces as the immediate threat to developed countries, rather than modern nation-
states with similarly technologically advanced military equipment, thus leading to an 
evolution toward insurgent warfare and away from conventional warfare, which has 
contributed to areas of growth and areas of decline in the industrial base. Third, with 
the onslaught of the global financial crisis in 2008, the trajectories of expansion in 
the global defense industrial base are shifting downward as the need for economic 
austerity and budget deficit / debt reduction puts greater pressure on various areas 
of the budget, including military spending. As a result, the challenges for large US 
defense contractors are growing, as they compete with smaller entrants in certain 
product areas, as they struggle to evolve their business base towards growing 
markets and growing product segments, and as they handle the dual role of foreign 
countries and foreign defense contractors as allies and customers on the one hand, 
and as competitors on the other hand.  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the evolution of the US and global 
defense industrial base in response to the shifting economic and strategic 
landscape. Specifically, it examines the impact of macroeconomic factors on the 
defense industrial bases in the US and overseas, and discusses the trends in fiscal 
debts and deficits and their potential impact on military spending. Second, it 
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away from conventional warfare on the defense industrial base, and discusses areas 
of growth, as well as potential shrinkage. Third, it evaluates the ability of large 
defense contractors to compete with smaller firms in growing market spaces due to 
rising legacy overhead costs, as well as the financial impact of the strategic business 
base shift of large defense contractors. The analysis then assesses the development 
of the global defense industrial base and the role of foreign contractors in the US 
defense industrial base. In examining global supply chain arrangements, which 
promote interlinkages between domestic industrial bases, the study looks at the role 
of exchange rate volatility and declining military spending on defense products. 
Finally, the analysis examines the greater orientation overseas of elements of the 
US defense industrial base which are focused on traditional military equipment, as 
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II. The Impact of the US Fiscal Landscape on 
the Defense Industrial Base 
The US is facing the challenges of increased US debt and widening deficits, 
partially due to its efforts to stem the financial crisis and to re-stimulate the economy 
in the recent period of slow economic growth. Efforts to reduce the US debt and 
deficit over time may put pressure on other areas of the budget, such as defense 
spending.  
The US deficit for FY 2009 was $1.4 trillion, which was 9.9% of GDP 
(Calmes, 2010). President Obama’s budget, submitted to Congress in early 
February, 2010, would result in a $1.56 trillion deficit, which is the highest level in 
history (Neefus, 2010). The deficit has only climbed to 5% or more of GDP four 
times since the end of World War II (Weisman, 2010).  The Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) has suggested that the annual deficits in the US could result in a 
national debt which is equal to the value of the nation’s entire economic output by 
2020 (Calmes, 2010). 
As is evident in Figure 1, the ratio of gross federal debt to GDP rose from 
57.3% in 2000 to 69.2% in 2008 to 83.4% in 2009. The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) projections suggest that it will continue to rise as a percentage of 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 4 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=









































































Gross Federal Debt as
a Percent of GDP
Gross Federal Debt
minus amount held by
government accounts
as a percent of GDP
 
Figure 1. US Debt as a Percent of GDP, 1999-2015 (est.) 
Source of underlying raw data in this graph: The President’s Budget FY 2011,  
Table 7.1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget 
Figure 2 shows the historical trends in government spending, federal 
payments to individuals, and defense spending over the past fifty years. Government 
spending as a percentage of GDP has risen over time, with a significant increase 
during 2008-2009.  Similarly, federal payments to individuals have risen as a percent 
of GDP during the past fifty years, with the introduction of many of the “Great 
Society” programs in the 1960’s, and have also exhibited a significant increase 
during 2008-2009. Defense spending has declined over this period; it peaked at 14% 
of GDP in 1952, but has been below 10% of GDP every year since 1968. Defense 
spending was at or above 10% of GDP every year from 1952 through 1962 (except 
for 1961, when it was 9.9%). Over the past twenty years, defense spending has 
risen and fallen as a percentage of GDP.  Defense spending fell from 5.8% of GDP 
in 1989 to 3.1% in 2001, due to the end of the Cold War, then experienced an 
increase with the Global War on Terror such that, by 2009, it was 4.9%. 
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the federal budget, it is also strongly affected by the strength of immediate or 
potential military threats. 

































































as a Percent of
GDP
Federal Payments
for Individuals as a
Percent of GDP
 
Figure 2. US Government Expenditures as a Percent of GDP, 1948-2009 
Source of underlying raw data in this graph: The President’s Budget FY 2011, Table 
15.5, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that US defense outlays as 
a percentage of GDP will fall over the next ten years, and that the interest payments 
on debt will increase as a percentage of GDP. Figures 3 and 4 show these projected 
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Figure 3. Projections as a Percent of GDP for US Defense Outlays  
and Interest on Debt: 2010-2020 
Source of underlying data: the Congressional Budget Office’s Budget and 
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020, Table 3-1, p.48. 



















































Figure 4. Projections in Billions of Dollars for US Defense Outlays  
and Interest on Debt: 2010-2020 
Source of underlying data: the Congressional Budget Office’s Budget and 
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The US military is being reshaped to combat insurgent foes through irregular 
warfare, rather than to engage in combat against more traditional foes 
(superpowers). This shift in perspective has been reflected in recent Department of 
Defense (DoD) budget requests. As of February, 2010, the Obama administration 
sought $708 billion in FY 2011 for DoD. It included greater funding for unmanned 
aerial vehicles, a reduction in more high-tech weapons systems, and an emphasis 
on cost growth—particularly an end to production of the C-17 and the second engine 
design (from GE and Rolls Royce) for the F-35. The base budget request was 
$548.9 billion, which was 3.4% higher than in 2010. The largest increase in spending 
was in the operations and maintenance account, which is used for pay, fuel, etc, and 
which was to rise 8.5% to $200.2 billion. Funding for military hardware was to rise to 
$112.9 billion—an increase of 7.7%. This was to include purchases of UAV’s from 
General Atomics, and helicopters from Sikorsky (United Technologies) and Boeing. 
The F-35 was the largest single program at $10.9 billion (Cole, 2010, February 17). 
It is likely that the pace of cutting expensive or poorly performing weapons 
development programs may slow over the next few years, since the significant ones 
have already been targeted (Cole, 2010). The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
has also emphasized more fuel efficient armored vehicles, unmanned drones, 
helicopters (Cole and Dreazen, 2010). 
The shift in defense priorities and hard budget constraints can lead to the 
evolution of the defense industrial base and the attenuation of certain product areas. 
One example of the impact of hard budget constraints and shifting defense priorities 
on the elimination of a program is the F-22. The original concept for an advanced 
tactical fighter was conceived in 1981 during the Cold War, but the first F-22 actually 
entered USAF service at the end of 2005. Its original purpose was to field air-to-air 
combat in a traditional warfare situation so that solders on the ground would not be 
impacted by aerial attacks from the enemy and bombers could reach their target. 
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are different in that the enemy is an insurgent 
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opposing Air Force. As a result, the role of airpower is largely to protect troops on 
the ground and to airlift supplies. The Air Force already had 183 planes and four on 
the way. It wanted 20 more planes ($4 billion) for 2010 and hoped to have a total of 
387 by the end of the decade. The Air Force studies justifying the 387 planes were 
based on the assumption that the US should be prepared to fight two major wars at 
the same time with foes that had similarly modern air forces.  Consequently, it was 
concluded that the F-35, which is smaller and cheaper, could do a better job at 
destroying surface-to-air missiles, although not quite as good a job at shooting down 
planes. On July 17, 2009, the Senate voted (58-40) to end the F-22 program.  This is 
likely to have a substantive impact on the defense industrial base because the F-
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III. The Impact of Defense Spending and the 
Defense Industrial Base on Regional 
Economies  
Although 2009 defense spending was only 4.9% of GDP, the defense 
presence in regional economies has strong spillover effects and can lead to 
substantive development of skills in the local labor market. 
Washington DC is an example of an area where defense spending has strong 
regional spillover effects and where reductions in defense spending can affect local 
labor market conditions.  Federal spending in the DC area rose from 33% of the 
spending in the regional economy in 2000 to 37% in 2010. The volume of defense 
procurement contracts in the area rose from $12 billion to $35 billion between 2000 
and 2010. Many defense contractors exhibited significant growth; for example, 
General Dynamics, headquartered in Falls Church, VA, expanded from 1100 local 
employees in 2000 to nearly 6000 by 2005. Similarly, Arlington-based CACI 
International had 2600 area employees in 2001 and now has close to 6200 (Censer 
& Whoriskey, 2010).  
Charleston, SC is a second example of an area where defense spending has 
strongly impacted the region. Many MRAPs are built by manufacturers based in 
Charleston (Force Protection) and some of the technology is developed by 
companies in the area (SAIC and SCRA). The MRAPs are outfitted with technology 
at Charleston’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center. Between 2000 and 2007, 
IT employment in the area grew 52% , while it only grew 9% nationally. The growth 
in engineers, architects, and scientists grew 52% in this area, but fell 3% nationally. 
As a result, partially due to defense spending, South Carolina is second only to 
Michigan in its concentration of industrial engineers (“Charleston: A Turn in the 
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A third example is the impact that the Northrop/ EADS proposal which won 
the 2008 aerial refueling tanker competition, would have had on Alabama. Airbus 
planned to assemble the A330 freighter and the KC-45 in a $600 million plant in 
Mobile, bringing 1500 jobs to the city and stimulating $360 million in economic 
activity (Binns, 2008).  
In the current environment of sustained, high unemployment, Congressional 
representatives have become increasingly concerned about the labor market 
impacts of reducing certain defense programs. The development of an industrial 
base across many states by a defense contractor for a particular system can be a 
strategy for survival because, especially in the current labor markets, it can mobilize 
Congressional representatives to encourage preservation of the weapons system.  
For example, the C-17 Globemasters are large cargo planes produced by 
Boeing which cost about $250 million each. They have been used extensively for 
transportation of troops and supplies since 1993. The Pentagon has indicated little 
need for new C-17’s every year since 2006, but Congress continues to authorize 
funds for the planes. The C-17 is manufactured in 43 states and employs 30,000 
workers. Senator Boxer had encouraged funding for the plane—the Long Beach C-
17 assembly plant employs 5000. About 650 suppliers are supported, and the 
impact of closing the line has been estimated to be $5.8 billion per year (Elgin and 
Epstein, 2009). Boeing has noted that C-17 line closure would be the end of the “last 
large military-jet aircraft production line in the US,” and noted that Europe would then 
be the suppliers (Butler and Norris, 2009). Nevertheless, what will be the impact on 
skill sets and labor markets if the C-17 were terminated and, in later time periods, 
the US needed more than its current fleet of 223 C-17’s and 111 C-5’s? (“DoD 
Brass,” 2010). Can commercial wide-body aircraft production capability be adapted 
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IV. Areas of Growth and Shrinkage in the 
Defense Industrial Base 
There are concerns that a gap in work from the termination of certain types of 
defense programs could lead to the atrophy of a specialized skills base, which, in the 
absence of defense work, would not be able to grow with commercial sector 
demand. For example, although current profits may be good in particular sub-sectors 
due to orders of existing models, reduced demand for next generation Pentagon 
programs can reduce the growth of design teams, which can hinder the strength of 
the sector in developing future systems.  
One example is the concerns over the industrial base for large body solid 
rocket motors (SRM’s). Several US companies a few decades ago were involved in 
the solid rocket motor (SRM) space: Hercules, Atlantic Research Corporation, 
Thiokol, Aerojet, and the United Technology Corp’s Chemical Systems Decision 
(Butler & Morring, 2009). ATK and Aerojet are the two prime contractors in this 
space today. ATK has most of the DoD and NASA production contracts for large 
SRM’s, with Aerojet’s work stemming from the USAF’s R&D program. Aerojet and 
ATK share the small SRM production work. If there are no new development 
programs for the space sector, the SRM industry could lose its ability to produce the 
next generation (Butler & Morring, 2009). The sustainment of the Air Force’s 
Minuteman III program and the Navy’s Trident II D5 program at a low level has 
helped to maintain the SRM industrial base, but a gap in skills is developing (“US 
Solid Rocket Motor Industry,” 2009; “Lawmakers Call on DoD,” 2010). President 
Obama’s FY 2011 NASA budget request called for the elimination of the 
Constellation (a space shuttle replacement effort) that included the developmental 
Ares I launch vehicle, the Orion crew capsule, and the future Ares V heavy lift rocket 
(“Solid Rocket Motor Industry,” 2010). Although the fate of the Constellation program 
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there may not be enough business to sustain 2 large SRM producers, which could 
lead to further consolidation in the industry.  
Certain areas of the defense industrial base are also exhibiting growth, with 
the shift in defense priorities. The UAV market, for example, is estimated to be worth 
$62 billion over the next 10 years and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown 
the potential for this market (“Teal Group,” 2009). At the beginning of the war, the 
unmanned systems made up about 4% of the Army’s flying hours; now, they make 
up 40%. In 2007, UAV’s were performing 21 combat air patrols at any one time—a 
total of 100,000 hours. Forecasts suggest that by 2011, they will reach 350,000 
hours and 54 patrols (Kaplan, 2009). UAV’s have lower purchase costs (less 
extensive electronics systems than manned aircraft), lower operating costs (less 
fuel, don’t need a lot of logistics support, don’t need big runways, and require less 
pilot training), as well as less personnel risk (Cole, 2009).  
The UAV market has provided opportunities for smaller, innovative, younger 
firms, as well as for more established defense contractors, which are expanding into 
the product space partially through acquisitions. Some examples of the smaller firms 
include General Atomics, which makes the Predator and Reaper planes; 
Aerovironment,  which makes the Raven and is also developing the Global Observer 
platform;  the UK developer Qinetiq, which has been developing an ultra long 
duration, high altitude UAS called Zephyr; and the Israeli UAS platform maker Elbit. 
Larger firms are also involved in this space, partially by enhancing their capabilities 
and reinforcing their skill sets through acquisitions of smaller firms. For example, 
Northrop Grumman, which produces the Global Hawk, acquired some of its 
capabilities from its acquisition of Ryan Aeronautics, which had expertise in target 
drone production and design. Northrop also bought Swift Engineering, which has 
expertise in designing blended wing UAV’s. Rockwell Collins has become a 
significant supplier of avionics for unmanned and manned aircraft because it 
acquired Athena Technologies, a pioneer in flight control systems for UAV’s, in 
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ScanEagle UAV for tuna hunting, but turned more to defense after 9-11. Boeing’s 
UAV business includes the A160T autonomous helicopter and the Phantom Ray 
unmanned combat aircraft demonstrator; Boeing’s  acquisition of Frontier, an 
unmanned helicopter developer, helped in developing its knowledge pool in this area 
(Warwick, 2009). 
UAV’s are stimulating other, related areas of the defense industrial base. For 
example, sensors are being designed around the constraints and advantages of 
UAV’s. One example is the Forester foliage-penetration radar flown on the A160T 
takes advantage of the long endurance, high altitude and precise low speed control 
of unmanned helicopters. A second example is the Artemis 25-Ghz radar for 
Northrop’s unmanned helicopter, the MQ-8B Fire Scout. Use of unmanned aircraft in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have led to increased demand for full motion video, such as 
the Gorgon Stare wide-area airborne surveillance pod on MQ-9 Reaper (Warwick, 
2009).  
Propulsion systems for UAV’s are another area of development since most of 
the engines have their origins in either non-aviation markets or manned aircraft. 
Solar cells and advanced batteries may be the engines for longer-endurance aircraft 
such as Qinetiq’s Zephyr. Liquid hydrogen is also considered as a source of power 
for high altitude UAV’s like the Global Observer (AeroVironment). Modifications for 
the hand-launched UAS’s, such as Aerovironment’s Raven B, to use hybrid fuel cell / 
battery powerpacks are in progress (Warwick, 2009). 
Consequently, while certain areas of the defense industrial base are 
experiencing attenuation in skill sets, new market areas and skill sets are 
developing. Market entry opportunities exist for newer firms in these segments, 
unlike traditional market segments, such as fighter jets, due to lower barriers to 
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V. The Impact of Overhead Costs for Large, 
Defense Contractors on their Competitive 
Advantage 
As new areas of development of the defense industrial base result in larger, 
traditional firms competing with smaller, younger firms, can traditional prime 
contractors maintain the low cost and rapid innovation needed for this market? With 
the impact of potential defense cuts of larger, traditional systems, will they have to 
raise rates to support their overhead base and will they lose their cost-based 
competitive advantage in competing with smaller, younger firms? 
One example of a force which could lead to a substantive increase in 
overhead rates for older, traditional, defense contractors is the impact on their 
overhead costs of funding their pensions, which are significantly underfunded. 
Younger firms have fewer retired workers and fewer defined benefit pension 
obligations. This could impact the ability of larger firms to maintain a sustained cost-
based competitive advantage in areas of growth in the defense industrial base.  
As of the spring of 2010, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) 
forecast that major prime contractors would experience an increase of $53 billion in 
pension costs between 2010 and 2016. Part of this is due to the degree to which 
pension plans are underfunded—the result of an increase in pension obligations and 
the sensitivity of pension assets to the movements in the financial market. Part of 
this is also due to the implementation of the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, 
which required that a pension plan be fully funded.  Due to implementation of the 
PPA, defense contractors have anticipated greater funding requirements beginning 
in 2011; indeed, Lockheed Martin’s 10-K (Lockheed Martin, 2010b) and General 
Dynamics’ 10-K (General Dynamics, 2010b) specifically stated this. Large defense 
contractors with revenues in excess of $5 billion were given until January 1, 2011 to 
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with the US Government Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). CAS 412/ 413 require 
that the pension costs of a contractor can be allocated to government contracts, 
such that the pension costs can be recovered as allowable costs. This may 
significantly impact the Department of Defense in terms of higher rates on weapons 
products from defense contractors, both because of the higher pension costs for 
defense contractors due to the need to fully fund pension plans under the PPA, and 
also because of the degree to which these costs are allowable and hence 
recoverable. As Northrop Grumman’s 10K of February 9, 2010 noted, “contractors 
will be entitled to seek an equitable adjustment for the additional CAS contract costs 
required” (Northrop Grumman, 2010b) and, as General Dynamics’ 10-K (General 
Dynamics, 2010b) noted, “our contractual arrangements with the US government 
provide for the recovery of contributions to our pension plans covering employees 
working in our government contracting business.”  
Figure 5 suggests that the present value of pension obligations rose over time 
for all five contractors, although the relative ordering of the magnitudes remained 
roughly stable. Boeing had the most substantial pension obligations, followed by 
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Figure 5. Fair Value of Plan Assets 
Source of data in the graph: Capital IQ database 
Figure 6 shows that the fair value of pension plan assets fell between 1999 
and 2002 for 4 of the 5 contractors, increased between 2002 and 2007, and then fell 
between 2007 and 2008. Not surprisingly, Boeing consistently had the highest fair 
value of pension assets (since it had the most significant obligations) and General 
Dynamics had the lowest value of pension assets. All of the defense contractors 
experienced an increase in the value of their pension assets in 2009, returning to 
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Figure 6. Present Value of Pension Obligations 
Source of data in the graph: Capital IQ database 
Figure 7 shows the degree of funding or underfunding of pensions (the 
degree to which assets exceed obligations) over time. All five defense contractors 
experienced declining funding status between 1999 and 2001 such that, by 2002, all 
of the plans were underfunded. Some of the plans, such as Boeing’s, experienced 
some improvement in their funding status between 2002 and 2007, but then fell 
sharply between 2007 and 2008 as the markets in which the pension fund assets 
were invested declined. General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman have among the 
most well-funded pension plans as measured by the magnitude of the gap between 
assets and obligations, and Lockheed Martin and Boeing have the most 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 19 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 




























Figure 7. Comparison of Net Pension Funding Status 
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VI. The Impact of Shifting Defense Priorities 
on the Business Base and Financial Health 
of Defense Contractors  
In an effort to shift their business base toward areas of growth to generate 
profits as well as to cover overhead costs (including previously incurred pension 
costs), defense contractors are focusing more on the types of equipment which are 
currently in demand, thus leading to growth in some areas of the defense industrial 
base and to contraction in other areas.  
Figure 8 shows the trend in net income margins of defense contractors over 
the past decade; net income margins were declining for many of the defense 
contractors prior to the initiation of the Global War on Terror, and then they 
experienced an increase. Since 2007 (or 2008, depending on the contractor), the 
defense contractors have experienced declining margins or a decline in margins, 
followed by an increase.  



















































Figure 8. Net Income Margins of Defense Contractors, 1999-2009 
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The impact of shifts in business base in response to evolving defense 
priorities is evident in the second quarter earnings and projections of the defense 
contractors. For example, Lockheed Martin’s second quarter profit increased 12% 
relative to last year. The largest unit of Lockheed Martin, the electronic systems unit, 
experienced an increase in revenues of 3.9% and an increase of 1.6% in earnings 
due to improved sales of sensors, missiles, and fire control systems. Its aeronautics 
group experienced a 6.8% fall in earnings partially due to less volume on the F-22, 
F-16, and F-35 contracts (Lockheed Martin, 2010c). Similarly, General Dynamics’s 
second quarter profit grew at 4.9%.  Its information technology segment, its largest 
segment, exhibited a 12% increase in sales. The aerospace group exhibited higher 
operating margins, despite reduced sales, and the company was optimistic about the 
increase in orders for Gulfstream business jets on the commercial aircraft side 
(General Dynamics, 2010c). 
Northrop Grumman’s recent decisions have emphasized the need for synergy 
in an environment of fiscal austerity and shifting areas of focus in defense markets. 
Northrop Grumman’s second quarter earnings rose 81% because sales increased in 
four of its five divisions. Due to increased demand for unmanned and manned 
aircraft, Northrop Grumman’s earnings in its aerospace division increased 30% from 
the second quarter of last year.  
Northrop Grumman is moving toward the divestiture of its shipbuilding unit, 
due to a lack of synergies with its other units, and plans to focus more on its 
information systems, unmanned aircraft, and electronics businesses (Pfeiffer, 
2010d). It plans to close the Avondale shipyard in Louisiana which supports 5000 
direct jobs and 6500 indirect jobs by 2013 and to consolidate production of the 
remaining two ships in the LPD-17 class at its Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula to 
reduce overhead and to generate improved efficiencies and lower production costs. 
The shipbuilding unit currently includes the Newport News shipyard, in addition to 
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nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and one of two shipyards which builds nuclear-
powered submarines for the Navy (“Northrop CEO,” 2010; Frost, 2010; Schmidt, 
2010). Consequently, purchase of the unit by a foreign buyer may have 
complexities. Other possibilities include private equity firms as buyers, or another 
defense firm, such as General Dynamics. General Dynamics owns the other three 
major military shipyards—Bath Ironworks, Electric Boat, and NASSCO—and ran into 
antitrust difficulties when it attempted to purchase Newport News prior to Northrop 
Grumman’s purchase of it in 2001. 
Figure 9 shows the declining trend over time in shipbuilding and marine 
systems as a percentage of total revenue for the two major US military 
shipbuilders—General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman (which entered the 
industry in 2001). Figure 9 also highlights the greater share of marine services for 
General Dynamics in most years relative to the share of shipbuilding in Northrop 
Grumman’s revenue. 
Shipbuilding and Marine Systems as a 
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Source of underlying raw data in the graph: Capital IQ database
Defense contractors involved in production of commercial aircraft, such as 
Boeing and EADS, have experienced increased demand for commercial aircraft, 
which may bolster profits if military sales decline. Diversification of their business 
base will assist them in responding to shifts in the defense industrial base. Although 
EADS reported a net profit of 185 million euros for the first two quarters of 2010, 
which was half of the profit that it had reported for the first two quarters of 2009, it 
was optimistic about the future outlook due to the surprising recovery in the civil 
aviation market, as evidenced by increased orders at the Farnborough Air show. 
Despite potentially declining orders in the military markets, production in the 
commercial aircraft market through Airbus, EADS’ commercial division, helps to 
diversify risk (Pearson, 2010). 
Boeing, which obtains 43% of its revenue from US government contracts and 
is more diversified on the commercial side than other defense contractors, was 
similarly favorably surprised by the increased orders for commercial jets. Boeing’s 
second quarter earnings fell 21%: the defense segment’s operating margin in the 
second quarter fell 1.2 percentage points to 8.9% because of the decline in 
revenues from all defense units except aircraft. This decline was even greater than 
the decline in the operating margin exhibited by the commercial jet division, where 
the decline in the operating margin was 0.5 percentage points, falling to 9.2%. 
Boeing reduced its forecast for its defense unit’s operating margin by half a 
percentage point for 2010 and may undertake layoffs (Ray, 2010).  
 The 100-149 seat jet market, which includes Boeing 737’s and Airbus 
A320’s, is likely to be worth $360 billion over the next twenty years (P.Clark, 2010).  
Boeing predicted that almost 70% of its commercial aircraft sales over the next two 
decades would be single aisle aircraft similar in capacity to the 737’s and the A320’s 
(N. Clark, 2010). At the Farnborough Air Show in late July, there was increasing 
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leasing companies. For example, Air Lease Corporation purchased 60 single- aisle 
Boeing 737’s to lease to budget airlines, as well as 51 A320’s and 20 jets from 
Brazil’s Embraer group (P. Clark, 2010). Lessors owned 23% of jetliners in 1990, 
and now own over 33% of them (Michaels, 2010). 
Monthly production rates for the 737 will increase for Boeing; they currently 
complete production on one 737 per day, but they hope to produce 35 per month by 
2012 (Pfeiffer & Clark, 2010a); similarly, Airbus, the commercial unit of EADS, 
announced that it would increase output of single aisle jets to 38 per month by the 
third quarter of 2011 and to 40 per month by the first quarter of 2012. Competition 
from other manufacturers is likely to increase in this sub-market: for example, 
Bombardier has been developing the CSeries (due to be released in 2013) to 
compete with the A320 and the 737. The CSeries will also compete with the C919, 
to be released in 2016, which is manufactured by the Commercial Aircraft 
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VII. The Role of Fiscal and Economic 
Constraints on Interdependencies in the 
Global Defense Industrial Base 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that “defense manufacturing is a 
global business.” Similarly, Dr, Ashton Carter, Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L), 
has noted that European products are “part of a ‘global industrial base’ that deserve 
consideration, especially if these designs can be purchased at a lower cost” (Butler, 
2009). The interdependencies between US and foreign industrial bases are evident 
in a number of ways. For example, the littoral combat ships are being built in foreign-
owned facilities in Mobile, AL (Austal) and Marinette, Wisconsin (Marinette Marine, 
owned by Fincantieri). About 75% of the helicopters used by Homeland Security 
were built in Italy, Germany, or France.  About 80% of the mine-resistant vehicles 
ordered are based on vehicle designs from outside the US.  
As Figure 10 shows, however, most of the large Department of Defense 
contracts are awarded to US firms as the lead contractor, with only a smaller 
percentage being awarded to foreign firms—a trend which has been relatively stable 














Figure 10. Percentage of Large Department of Defense Contracts  
Awarded to US firms as the Lead Contractor versus Foreign Firms 
Sources of data: Report Required by Section 812 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004: Foreign Sources of Supply, annual (Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics) 
Nevertheless, although many US weapons systems do not have foreign 
contractors as the primary contractor, the US is involved with the defense industrial 
bases of other countries through global supply chain arrangements. The 
development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is an example of one of the most 
extensive global alliances in the defense sector. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 
in purchasing more JSF’s, has emphasized the commitment of the US to systems 
which are compatible with its allies and which are developed through global alliances 
(Lockheed Martin, 2008). The F-35 involves 9 different contractors from various 
countries, led by Lockheed Martin, with Northrop Grumman and BAE as the primary 
subcontractors, and is supported by 600 suppliers in 30 countries (“Aerospace 
Production,” 2009). The F-35 is intended to replace 13 different types of aircraft 
across 11 different countries (Lockheed Martin, 2008). The US plans to buy 2443 of 
these aircraft, and the UK, Turkey, and Italy also plan to buy hundreds of them, 
which will increase production to around 3000. The F-35 will take advantage of 
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Marines, and Navy’s planes will be based on a common design, which will generate 
economies of scale in production, and which will use the same sustainment 
infrastructure worldwide.  
The recent environment of fiscal austerity can, however, impact the success 
of these global supply chain arrangements in several ways. First, budget deficits in 
European countries can lead to reduced demand for military equipment, including 
purchases of the JSF and other defense products made through global supply 
chains. Second, exchange rate volatility can impact the profitability of global supply 
chain arrangements, as smaller European producers can become squeezed, and, as 
certain European financial markets weaken, their access to bank financing becomes 
even more limited.   
Figure 11 shows the substantive increase in cross- country debt to GDP 
ratios between 1990 and 2009.  All of the countries (even those which had exhibited 
a declining trend prior to the financial crisis, such as Canada) have experienced 
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Figure 11. Cross-Country Debt-to-GDP Ratios, 1990-2009 
Source of raw data in the graph: International Monetary Fund’s World 
Economic Outlook Database 
Figure 12 shows cross-country evidence on deficits as a percentage of GDP 
in 2009. Greece, for example, has a national debt equal to 113% of GDP and a 
deficit of 12.7% of GDP, which is much higher than the maximum of 3% allowed by 
the EU. Greece plans to undertake initiatives to reduce the deficit to 3% by 2012; 
similarly, Italy (whose debt is 113% of GDP), Portugal, Spain, and Ireland have high 
budget deficits. The upcoming budget austerity in the European countries to reduce 
national debt will ultimately impact their defense spending and have implications for 
the financial costs of their involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as for their 
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Figure 12. Deficits as a Share of GDP in 2009 
Source of underlying raw data in the graph: Congressional Budget Office and 
the International Monetary Fund 
For example, Germany plans to cut $10.5 billion from the defense budget by 
2014. Spain cut defense spending by 9% this year, Italy will reduce defense 
spending by 10% next year, and France is freezing defense spending (“Defense 
spending,” 2010). The UK, which is the largest European force in Afghanistan, may 
reduce defense spending by 10-20% over the next 5 years. The UK ‘s National Audit 
Office has suggested a 36 billion pound hole in the UK procurement budget over the 
next decade. Programs such as the F-35 (the UK is currently expected to buy 138 
planes), a second aircraft carrier for the Royal Navy, and the final order of the 
Eurofighter Typhoon could be in jeopardy. In the UK, defense expenditures have 
declined from 4.4% of GDP in 1987 to 2.5% in 2007, while R&D spending has 
declined by a quarter over the past three years (Pfeiffer, 2010a).  
The exchange rate volatility can also have a significant impact on the profitability of 
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rate over the past year, as investors began moving away from the euro as concerns 
arose about the ability of European countries to combat their deficits.  






































































Figure 13. Dollars Per Euro Exchange Rate, September 2009- 
September 2010 
Source of underlying raw data in the graph: Capital IQ database 
Exchange rate fluctuations in the euro caused by the economic crisis can 
impact the growth of the global defense industrial base in terms of their impact on 
exports and imports of ships and aircraft by Europe. As is evident in Figures 14 and 
15, the US, France, and Germany control 70.6% of global exports in the aircraft and 
spacecraft market; countries which are eurozone members—France, Germany, Italy, 
and Spain—control 38.7% of exports in this market. In the market for ships, the 
Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Germany, and Italy control over 65% of the export 
market; countries which are eurozone members—Germany, Italy, France, the 
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weakening euro is likely to make European exports of aircraft and ships more 
attractive to other non-European countries. 
































































Figure 14. Percentage of Global Exports in Aircraft, Spacecraft,  
and Associated Equipment 
Source of underlying raw data in the graph: UN International Merchandise 
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Figure 15. Percentage of Global Exports of Ships and Boats 
Source of underlying raw data in the graph: UN International Merchandise 
Trade Statistics, 2008 
As is shown in Figures 16 and 17, Germany, the US, France, India and China 
control almost 50% of global imports in the aircraft and spacecraft market; countries 
which are eurozone members—Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Ireland—control 
28.3% of imports in this market. The import market for ships is much more 
fragmented, with Germany, India, Norway, Italy and Greece controlling 36% of the 
market; countries which are eurozone members—Germany, Italy, Greece, and 
Belgium—control 25.2% of the market. Consequently, a weakening euro is likely to 
result in a reduced European demand for aircraft and ship imports, which can impact 
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Figure 16. Percentage of Global Imports of Aircraft, Spacecraft,  
and Associate Equipment 
Source of underlying data: UN International Merchandise Trade Statistics, 
2008 





































































Figure 17. Percentage of Global Imports of Ships and Boats 
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VIII. The Impact of the Evolving Strategic and 
Fiscal Landscape on the Areas of the 
Global Defense Industrial Base 
The global defense industrial base is evolving across regions. The demand 
for traditional equipment is shrinking in the US and Europe due to reduced demand 
in US and European defense markets for traditional types of weapons systems used 
in conventional warfare, as well as the need to combat budget deficits and debt. 
Nevertheless, some regions, such as the Middle East and India, have growing 
defense budgets and consider their immediate threats to be modern nation states, 
thus increasing their demand for conventional weapons systems.  
For example, between 2001 and 2008, Middle Eastern countries bought 50% 
of the arms purchased from the US. Defense spending in the Middle East is forecast 
to reach $100 billion in 2014—11% of global arms sales. Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s 
defense spending has doubled between 2001 and 2008 to $43.52 billion (Bianchi, 
2009). Similarly, over the next 5 years, India, which was the tenth largest spender on 
the military in 2008, plans to spend $50-$55 billion on equipment procurement to 
protect itself against potential threats, especially from China and Pakistan. Indeed, 
India’s competition for an $11 billion contract for 126 fighter jets—the largest fighter 
jet competition since the 1990’s—involves US, European, and Russian defense 
contractors, such as Saab, Dassault, Boeing, Eurofighter, RAC MiG (Russia), etc. 
(Lerner, 2010; Gulati, 2010; Misquitta, 2009; Blumenthal, 2010). The largest Indo-
American defense deal so far is the (in process) $3.5 billion purchase of 10 C-17’s, 
at the same period in history in which the Pentagon is recommending the end of the 
C-17 program. India bought 6 C-130 J’s in 2007 for $962 billion, 8 Boeing P-8I 
aircraft for $2.1 billion in 2009, etc. 
Not surprisingly, US and European defense contractors are targeting 
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traditional equipment more toward overseas markets than they have done 
historically. Indeed, the market for replacement of military aircraft in countries such 
as Brazil, Switzerland, Denmark, Korea, and India could encompass 3345 aircraft 
and could collectively be worth $164 billion by 2017 (Lerner, 2010). Among the US 
contractors, Lockheed Martin plans to focus on overseas export sales to Asia and 
the Middle East, due to increased demand for F-16’s, PAC-3 air-defense missile 
systems, and C-130 transport planes. Lockheed Martin plans to expand international 
defense sales, which are about 13% of 2009 sales, to nearly 20% of sales by 2013. 
Boeing also plans to expand international defense sales, which are about 16% of 
Boeing’s 2009 defense revenues to 25% over the next 5 years (Pfeiffer & Clark, 
2010b). Figure 18 shows the shares of revenue from commercial and military sales 
to foreign countries over the past three years across the top five defense 
contractors; Boeing is the most oriented toward the international market, while 
Northrop Grumman is the least oriented. 
Percentage of Revenue from Commercial and 

































Figure 18. Percentage of Revenue from Commercial and Military  
Sales to Foreign Countries 
Source of underlying raw data in this graph: 2009 annual reports for General 
Dynamics, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing, as well as 
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European defense contractors, such as EADS, BAE, and Finnmeccanica, are 
targeting markets beyond Europe. Indeed, Stefan Zoller, head of defense and 
security at EADS, recently noted that “European markets will decline or be stable at 
best…Strategically, we have to go where the money is and the money is around the 
globe.”  The company will have to “generate growth to maintain our industrial base at 
home.” EADS is targeting markets such as Brazil (which experienced a 23% 
increase in military spending in 2009), the Middle East, and India. EADS plans to 
increase the share of its employees who are located outside Europe from 5% in 
2009 to 20% in 2020 (Pfeiffer & Clark, 2010b). Finmeccanica (Italy), which has 
established a strong presence in the US and in the UK (where it owns BAE’s former 
avionics group and Agusta Westland’s helicopter group) is a second example. 
Finnmeccanica noted this March that it expected 50% of its orders in 2010 to come 
from outside the US, the UK, and Italy. Finnmeccanica is targeting India, the Middle 
East, Turkey, Algeria, Brazil, and Libya, as well as Russia. BAE is a third example; it 
only obtains 20% of its defense revenues from the UK (Pfeiffer, 2010b). 
Overseas contracts and alliances between developing countries and defense 
contractors in developed countries could help to expand the defense industrial base 
in the developing countries. For example, in procuring defense equipment overseas, 
India also is trying to develop its own defense industrial base. Although it makes 
aircraft, land vehicles, and small arms, it is trying to develop more in the high tech 
equipment area of its domestic defense industrial base and hopes to reduce imports 
from 70% to 30% over the next decade as its own base develops. It engages in 
alliances with Western defense contractors to gain knowledge; examples include 
Mahindra Defense systems, which is in a $20 billion joint venture (since January 
2009) with BAE to develop mine protected vehicles; Larsen & Toubro, which teamed 
with Raytheon in February 2010 to upgrade the Indian Army’s Russian origin T-72 
tanks, and Hindustan Aeronautics which is building the Hawk 132 Advanced Trainer 
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A second avenue of expanding defense industrial bases in developing 
countries is through “offset agreements.” The global value of “offset” agreements, in 
which western defense contractors who have won defense contracts agree to 
directly or indirectly help to develop the industrial base of the purchasing country, 
are worth between $75 billion and $100 billion and require a certain percentage of 
the contract value to remain in the purchasing country. These agreements began 
after World War II and, since 1999, about 22 countries have developed formal 
“offset” legislation. Contractors consider “offsets” to be part of the cost for doing 
business overseas. In India, foreign companies winning import orders over $62 
billion must use domestic suppliers for at least 30% of the order. In the Middle East, 
the UAE requires that at least 50% of the contract’s value has to be reinvested in the 
local economy by the recipient of the contract.  Many “offsets”, however, have not 
provided the purchasing country what they had wanted: when Saudi Arabia, in 1985, 
purchased the $3.8 billion US Peace Shield program, the “offset” was targeted to 
create 75,000 jobs, yet the four resulting joint venture companies, as of 2009, only 
had 3540 staff. Taiwan, South Korea, and India are trying to formalize their needs for 









The global defense industrial base is facing a number of challenges in the 
orientation and strength of its interdependencies across countries. The US and 
European nations are combating fiscal and economic burdens which may 
increasingly put pressure on various segments of the budget, including defense, as 
more funding becomes needed for additional areas. The shift in defense priorities 
toward irregular warfare and away from conventional warfare, as well as potentially 
greater fiscal austerity will lead to the elimination of programs, such as the F-22. 
With stagnation in the labor markets, Congressional representatives may become 
more vocal about the cancellation of certain programs due to the impact on local 
labor markets and the powerful regional spillover effects of defense spending.  
Moreover, with the shift in defense priorities in the US, certain areas of the defense 
industrial base are likely to exhibit growth and other areas are likely to exhibit 
attenuation. These areas of growth, such as UAV’s, can spur the development of 
other sub-sectors of the defense industrial base. As new firms have the opportunity 
to enter segments of growth, older defense contractors with substantive legacy 
overhead costs, such as pensions, will struggle to maintain their cost-based 
competitive advantage as they re-orient their business base. 
The interdependencies across the global defense industrial base will be 
impacted by reductions in military spending, as well as exchange rate fluctuations, 
which can influence the profitability of global supply chain arrangements and the 
orientation of trade in military and commercial ships and aircraft. The growth in the 
defense budgets of other regions, such as India and the Middle East, and their 
significant demand for traditional military equipment for conventional warfare will 
result in an overseas re-orientation of conventional weaponry-focused aspects of the 
defense industrial base for US and European contractors, as demand in their 
domestic markets for these products lessens. Increased alliances and “offset” 
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developing nations will foster the growth of their defense industrial bases, thus re-
orienting the regional aspects of the global defense industrial base over time. In 
conclusion, the evolving fiscal, economic, and strategic landscape will hopefully 
contribute to the development of a more cost-effective and transparent global 
defense industrial base over time, as countries and companies re-orient and further 
develop their respective industrial bases and business bases
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